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Pseudo-rationalism is defined as a distorted ideology that believes reason or rationality is
superior to other components of minds (especially, emotion), which may lead to the
overestimation of one’s own rational ability and underestimation of others’ rationality. Such a
trait would be similar to rigidity or closed-mindedness measurable with other existing scales, but
also is expected to have some distinctive characteristics compared to them because it is based on
a certain myth in terms of reason. Also, if the psychological trait of pseudo-rationalism exists, it
is anticipated as a byproduct of a certain egocentric world-view represented by naïve realism.
This study aimed to develop and validate an empirically measurable scale of pseudo-rationalism.
After the initial items were created based on the structured definition of the concept of pseudorationalism, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to evaluate its construct validity. In
addition to the reliability estimate, the convergent and discriminant validity of this new construct
was tested by comparing it with other similar scales (e.g., dogmatism, perspective taking, and
intellectual humility).
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CHAPTER I: WHAT IS PSEUDO-RATIONALISM?
“Science is in the realm of reason, not sensibility.” said Suk-Chun Ryu, a former
professor in the Department of Sociology at Yonsei University, Republic of Korea, while
defending the remarks he made in the class that he called the comfort women, the sexual slaves
forced by the Japan Imperial, as ‘voluntary prostitution’ and the sexual harassment remarks he
made against female students in this process (Kim, 2019). His view of history in advocating for
the atrocities of imperialism and the lack of awareness of women’s rights in itself caused intense
controversy in Korean society, but the more serious was after such remarks. Under the
controversy, he focused on justifying himself and even denounced his opponents. The quote
above is illustrative: It implies that he just made a level-headed judgment by logical reasoning
(although it might be uncomfortable to someone) and the counterforces are rather irrationally
reproaching him based on the emotional judgment. Although he is protesting that he actually
made cool and ‘right’ judgments whereas the opponents are distorting the real intention of his
remarks to drive them into a sort of hate speeches, he seems not to be realizing that such a protest
per se refers to the emotional judgment to rationalize his extreme form of beliefs.
Similar ideas can be found not only in Korea but all over the world today. For example,
Ben Shapiro (2016), a famous right-wing commentator, once left the phrase “Facts don’t care
about your feelings”: This can be seen as a very similar value to the case discussed above,
considering that it also pursues the so-called ‘rationality’ that may make people uncomfortable.
Interesting is that he evidenced by himself that such an attitude was actually derived from
emotional justification, not the true rational judgment: In a recent interview with BBC, he
became the center of controversy for ending the conversation halfway with fury just because he
did not like the questions being posed (Haltiwanger, 2019). Such instances, in practice, may
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exemplify today’s rampant justification of heartlessness and counter-empathy: The claim of selfrationality, ironically, now became one of the most common attitudes among extremists.
Namely, such kinds of values are not only linked to antisocial or extremist arguments but also
contributing to even more justify or solidify such arguments or attitudes. Now we have to delve
into the origin of such values rather than focusing only on their arguments, which would make us
stuck to the reiteration of pointless superficial discourses. Stop criticizing every glamorized
dogma one by one, but let’s find out why they mistake dogma for reason from now. Why are
they eager to justify the dogma, which mars social empathy and creates needless social conflicts?
What is the essence of such values? They pretend to be rational, but not really are they. Their
myth of ‘reason’ is, wherever its motives, by itself the manifestation of their unreasonable bias,
which is sometimes exploited as the means of justification of the lack of empathy, as in the case
of Suk-Chun Ryu above. In other words, their pretense regarding ‘cold-heartedness’ is rather
deemed to be an emotional motive to coax themselves and others, which would compensate for
their lack of empathy, i.e., another byproduct of unintelligence.
Like this, the belief system that regards one’s rigidity as rationality and overestimates
one’s rational abilities is often called pseudo-rationalism. Despite the sporadic discussions
erstwhile about its concept and implications, however, little is known about the psychological
features of pseudo-rationalism yet. Hence, my goal is to identify the presence and nature of this
trait. As a starting point, this study aims to develop an instrument to empirically ‘measure’ such a
character and check whether such a measured trait is congruent with the features covered in the
existing social-philosophical discussion or the similar psychological theories to it. That way, we
would be able to start the full-fledged research in terms of the psychological implications of the
pseudo-rationalism and illusory intellectual superiority.
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What is Pseudo-Rationalism?
Popper (1945) represents the attempts to define the concept and characteristics of pseudorationalism. He argued that the true rationalism and pseudo-rationalism should not only be
clearly distinguished but also be considered as the complete antipode of each other. According to
him, the true rationalism should know one’s own limitations, how much one makes mistakes in
judgments, and how much we are indebted to others with regards to knowledge. Therefore, the
real rationalists understand that we cannot expect the impossible from reason, just trying to be
clearer than before rather than expect something clear. In contrast, pseudo-rationalism refers to
the ‘immodest belief’ of one’s intellectual superiority, pursuing certainty or authority. Such an
ideology that seeks absolute and immaculate truth is, although often taking the place of reason,
by itself diametrically opposed to rationalism.
Popper’s (1945) argument demonstrated a clear insight into the dangers of
pseudoscientific dogma that is not based on empirical evidence, although, paradoxically, he
rather has usually targeted to the scientific empiricism per se (i.e., he has been skeptical about
the scientific methodology of rational verification). In practice, since his argument, the term
‘pseudo-rationalism’ has often been utilized in the philosophical field as an expression of
skepticism to the belief that empirical studies or experiments can absolutely enhance rationality
(See Donohue, 2017; Nemeth, 1991). Therefore, such a term or argument is basically derived
from the discussion regarding the philosophy of science, whose contextual meaning is somewhat
unclear, and questions remain as to whether this is a universal propensity applicable to most
laypeople. In this study, however, I will continue talking under the premise that the pseudorationalism that Popper (1945) defined can also be the lay cognitive tendency universally
existent among people. That is, some people (even if they are not philosophers or scientists) tend
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to overestimate their so-called reasoning ability more than others do, and such tendency would
sometimes make them intensify the dogmatic attitudes about their current beliefs or derogate
others’ judgments different from their own as irrational.
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CHAPTER II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PSEUDO-RATIONALISM
The Tenets of Pseudo-Rationalism
If there is a psychologically definable concept of pseudo-rationalism, what characteristics
would represent such a tendency? The following is the nature of pseudo-rationalism defined in
this study or the traits predicted to be observed among pseudo-rationalists.

Fundamentals
•

Overestimation of the superiority of reason or logical reasoning, especially compared to
feelings or intuitions

•

Overestimation of one’s own rational abilities, especially compared to others

•

Ignorance of the uncertainty of the world and the primordial limitations in our
understandings of the world

•

The projection of such a tendency to other people that considers others as emotional and
irrational

Cognitive Features
•

Make a conclusive presumption based on limited evidence

•

Ignore or gloss over the limitations in evidence with assumptions from one’s ideology or
preexisting beliefs

•

Prescribe one’s conclusions or beliefs as absolutely true or completely rational, rejecting
the possibility of emotional influence in one’s own beliefs
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•

Assume those who have reached conclusions different or contrary to their own as
irrational or emotional

However, caution is that there are already lots of psychological instruments measuring
those that are similar to such features, maybe representing the jingle-jangle fallacy. Such features
are not very different from closed-mindedness or rigidity: specifically, dogmatism (Rokeach,
1954; blind faith in certain opinions or tenets), (lack of) perspective taking (understanding of
other people’s positions or perspectives), or (lack of) intellectual humility (modest or humble
view of one’s intellectual ability). These concepts are psychologically consensual, at least to
some extent, with the existing validated measures (dogmatism – Altemeyer, 2002; perspective
taking – Davis, 1980; intellectual humility – Leary et al., 2017). Nevertheless, I believe the
development of this new measure can be relevant because although they may share some
domain, it also has some distinct features from the existing measures mostly divided into the two
aspects following:
The Dichotomy Between Reason and Emotion
It is the common myth regarding human cognition among laypeople (or popular
psychologists) that reason and emotion are conflicting forces. Such myth, of course, has no
scientific basis: These two are, at most, orthogonal to each other (Ciarrochi et al., 2000), or even
the opposite may be true. For example, Côté and Miners (2006) reported the positive association
between general cognitive intelligence and emotional intelligence. Nevertheless, such a
dichotomy is well-observable in our daily life: For instance, we often use brain/head and heart
as the confronting terms. This seems even worse in South Korea: The Korean words e-sung
(which refers to reason) and gam-sung (which refers to emotion or sensibility) are commonly
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used as antonyms of each other, probably because of the framing effect that arises from their
nuances. As seen in such word pairs, this viewpoint seems like a quite traditional one, but it may
have become even severe in recent years because of the current fad of the Myers–Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI; Myers, 1998): In particular, today’s younger generations seem to be
consuming MBTI as a powerful Internet meme, uncritically accepting it in overall
communications or interpersonal relationships (Essig, 2014; Park, 2020). The dichotomous
distinction between thinking and feeling that this trait theory claims are being indiscriminately
consumed by many people, even though no scientific evidence supports this theory (Grant, 2013;
Thyer & Pignotti, 2015).
Illusory Intellectual Superiority
It hypothesizes that when such a dichotomy between reason and emotion polarizes, it
develops into the prejudice based on self-centeredness, which eventually leads to the superiority
complex and derogation/aggression towards others such as ‘I am rational, you are foolish.’
Although nothing has been clear about it yet, I predict this from some clues. For instance, the
analogies between rational choices and ‘should be’ and between emotional choices and ‘want to
be’ implies the propensity that only rational decisions can be the right decisions, whereas
emotional decisions are a kind of impulsive ones. We can see some expressions that deride the
emotions and emotional judgments, e.g., touchy-feely. There is also a similar expression to it in
Korea: Gam-sung-par-ee, which literally means emotion sellers, refers to the pejorative term of
emotional judgments or those who make (or in their words, misuse) such judgments. If some
‘extreme reason-supremacists’ use such words as an expression of mockery or aggression to
others, we may have to deal with such a phenomenon as a typical form of prejudice.
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Nevertheless, even if such a concept exists with distinctive features from the existing one
of closed-mindedness, nothing can be said yet about its psychological identity or mechanism. Is
it a natural (i.e., intrinsic) trait, a sort of self-enhancing defense mechanism to compensate for the
inferiority complex, or derived from the complex dynamics including them? Now we can only
see the phenomenon itself without well-established theories. However, we can predict something
regarding the origin of this characteristic: Social psychologists have accumulated many studies
with regards to people’s closed-mindedness and self-centered world views, which also includes
this trait. According to them, such tendencies begin from the distorted fundamental belief that
one is perceiving the world accurately and objectively, which eventually creates a series of
cognitive bias that believe oneself and one’s world view are thoroughly rational or the ‘metabias’ that perceive even such biases biasedly, resulting in the ironic overconfidence of one’s own
objectivity and rationality.

Theoretical Background: Naïve Realism
Naïve realism refers to the tendency that people believe that they are seeing the world
objectively whereas those who oppose them are senseless or biased (Ward et al., 1997). They
stated that naïve realism has three important tenets: the belief that one is perceiving the world
impartially and unbiasedly, the expectation that others will make the same conclusions as oneself
if they have the same information and the ability to rationally interpret it, and the assumption that
those who do not make the same conclusions would be ignorant, irrational, or biased. Such a
belief represents the propensity that people see their surroundings ‘as it is’ to secure the structure
of their scheme or outlook, which rather triggers umpteen self-centered biases. Although it is
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hard to directly measure such a tendency per se, we can figure out the existence of naïve realism
from its diverse cognitive outgrowths, which are typically divided into two traits following:
False Consensus Effect
The false consensus effect refers to the phenomenon in which people believe the opinions
they hold are universal and most of the other people would have the same opinions as to their
own. This is first discovered by Ross et al.’s (1977) famous experiment. The participants were
asked whether they could walk around the campus while putting on a big board sign written as
‘Eat at Joe’s’: Those who accepted it tended to believe that most other participants would also do
so, whereas those who rejected it tended to believe that most others would also reject it. Dobelli
(2013) said that in this experiment, those who answered yes described those who answered no as
‘stuck up and humorless,’ whereas those who answered no described those who answered yes as
‘idiots and attention seekers’: Namely, the participants tended to derogate those who made
different decisions from their own.
Although the false consensus effect has originally been studied as a universal tendency
equally applicable to all ordinary people, some individual differences in this effect have been
known, especially in terms of political orientations and prejudice. For instance, Rabinowitz et al.
(2016) reported that conservatives tended more to believe that most other people will agree with
themselves regarding the issue of child vaccination, whereas liberals showed the ‘illusion of
uniqueness’ that believes others will not agree with themselves (i.e., the reverse consensus
effect). Wojcieszak (2008) reported that the neo-Nazis, especially those who participate in the
online groups, are likely to have stronger false consensus biases compared to environmentalist
groups.
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Bias Blind Spot
The bias blind spot is a sort of ‘bias about bias.’ Even after being informed about certain
cognitive biases, people tend to believe that such biases do not pertain to themselves but only the
matter of others, and therefore, underestimate their own extent of bias and overestimate others’
extent of bias (Pronin et al., 2002). This is considered as a ‘meta-bias’ that people cannot
recognize their own biased views; their ignorance regarding bias is not one-dimensional but
stratified and comprehensive. More interesting is that those who are more biased are likely to
believe that they are not biased but objective: For instance, West and Eaton (2019) found that
people who are more prejudiced tend to claim more that they are not prejudiced, but rather,
egalitarian with regard to both racism and sexism. This is theoretically based on the DunningKruger effect which indicates that cognitively incompetent people rather overestimate their own
competency (Dunning, 2011), suggesting the contradictory (and intertangled) nature of the
relationship between cognition and metacognition. Similarly, Pronin and Kugler (2007) also
attempted to link bias blind spot to introspection illusion: They demonstrated that people are
likely to believe they are introspecting themselves well even when making judgments regarding
their own biases.

We can find that most of the features of naïve realism and its descendants are in line with
pseudo-rationalism: in particular, the belief that one’s own judgments would be rational, the
attitudes that assume those with different opinions as irrational and derogate them, and the ‘total
ignorance’ that stems from the lack of the true introspection of oneself. This is why I expect that
pseudo-rationalism will be included in the same framework as naïve realism, if it exists. Being
evidenced, pseudo-rationalism will be considered as a byproduct derived from the mechanism of
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self-centered dogma and the rationalization of it. I anticipate that it will also contribute to the
efficiency of psychometrics because it can substitute the current complex measurement of naïve
realism largely based on the cognitive assessment with a simple short scale.
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CHAPTER III: VALIDATION PROCESS
The validation process of pseudo-rationalism would be based on the suggestion of Flake
et al. (2017). They proposed the three main components of validity: substantive, structural, and
external. The substantive validity represents the qualitative analyses to verify whether the
developing scale is in line with the concept that is aimed to be measured, including literature
review, conceptualization, expert review, or other verifications regarding content relevance. The
structural validity refers to the quantitative measurement of the psychometric properties of the
scale and includes reliability check, factor analysis, or item analysis. In the external phase, the
developing scale is compared with other related constructs or criteria, being tested whether the
scale is well-convergent with and/or discriminant from other measures, predicts the relevant
criteria well, or successfully discriminates multiple known-groups.
In this validation process, the item conceptualization and organization based on the
definition of pseudo-rationalism proposed in the previous chapter would cover the substantive
validity. It includes the review and confirmation of my supervisors. The initial scale items made
through this process would be sorted out through the exploratory factor analysis to create the
final scale. The structural and psychometric properties would be confirmed in this process. Also,
the external validity would be tested by comparing this new scale with existing similar scales.
Ideally, the correlations between the pseudo-rationalism scale and other scales would show both
convergent validity (i.e., the correlations between pseudo-rationalism and the similar scales) and
discriminant validity (i.e., how much uniqueness this new pseudo-rationalism scale has
compared to the existing scales).
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Initial Item Selection
The initial items were created and organized based on the conceptualized characteristics
of pseudo-rationalism discussed above and aims to assess the various natures pseudo-rationalism
is expected to have in a balanced manner. They were measured with a 7-point scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These initial items consist of 27 items (see Appendix).

Validation Study
The purpose of this study was to develop and finalize the items, test the structural and
external validity of the construct, and confirm the psychometric properties of this scale. This
study also compared this scale with other scales that are based on similar concepts, conjugating
correlation analysis for testing convergent validity.
Participants
One-hundred and seventy-five participants, 18 years of age or older, were recruited from
Prolific.co. However, 26 responses were eliminated from the analysis because they did not pass
the attention check questions. Of the valid 149 responses, 63% were men and 34% were women;
79% were White and 14% were Hispanic. The average age was 26.6 (SD = 8.88), and 84% of
them aged 32 or less.
Item Factor Analysis
The factor structure of the finally selected items was identified through the exploratory
factor analysis with the maximum likelihood method. The sub-factors of this scale will be
determined in this process. The psychometric properties of this scale (e.g., Cronbach’s α) were
also estimated along with this process.
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Comparison with Similar Scales
This scale was compared with three other measures: dogmatism, perspective taking, and
intellectual humility.
Dogmatism (DOG). Altemeyer’s (2002) DOG scale is a representative measure of the
rigid and authoritarian personality, composed of 20 items with about .90 of Cronbach’s α. He
reported that those who answered that God chose every word and the Bible is free of any errors
tended to have 65% higher DOG score along with 62% higher right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA) score and 73% higher religious fundamentalism score, providing evidence for the
external validity of this measure. In that study, furthermore, among the initial ‘true believers’ of
God and the Bible, those who changed their opinions after facing the challenging evidence had
significantly lower DOG score than those who still insisted the absoluteness of them after then.
This scale consists of a 9-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
Perspective taking (PT). The perspective taking (PT), a subscale of Davis’ (1980, 1983)
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), was used. This scale measures how well people understand
others’ perspectives and predict the social consequences of their behaviors or attitudes towards
others. Davis (1980) reported the whole IRI’s internal consistency of .71 ~ .77 and test-retest
reliability of .62 ~ .71. Davis (1983) found that those who scored high on the perspective taking
tend to have low negative masculinity (r = -.28 for females and -.30 for males) and negative
verbal-aggressive femininity (r = -.25 for females and -.19 for males), high self-esteem (r = .20
~ .26 for females and .20 ~ .25 for males), and slightly high intelligence among women (r = .07
~ .13). This subscale consists of 7 items with a 5-point scale from 1 to 5.
Intellectual humility (IH). Leary et al.’s (2017) 6-item scale of intellectual humility
aims to measure the humbleness in intellectual aspects. With the Cronbach’s α of .73 ~ .82, this
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scale was positively related to open-mindedness (r = .43), curiosity (r = .27), autonomy (r = .31),
and courage (r = .30), whereas negatively connected to dogmatism (r = -.49 with the DOG
scale), ambiguity avoidance (r = -.32), and self-righteousness (r = -.35). Also, in this research,
those with high intellectual humility tended to be stable or consistent when rating other people’s
attitudes or capacity, regardless of the ratees’ political or social orientations. This scale consists
of a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (very well like me).
To check the convergent validity of pseudo-rationalism, the correlations between the
scales above and the finalized pseudo-rationalism scale were reported. As explained, the
successful development of the pseudo-rationalism scale should have both stable associations
with similar scales and distinctive characteristics from them. The convergent validity would be
confirmed if the new scale has sufficient correlations with the three existing scales. The
discriminant validity would be confirmed if the correlations of pseudo-rationalism with the
existing scales are not excessively high or considerably smaller than the correlations between the
three existing scales.
Procedure
Each participant, recruited from Prolific.co, got $1.10 for compensation. They completed
an online Qualtrics survey, which took about 10-15 minutes. First, they were told about the
information about the study (e.g., purpose of study, compensation, benefits or risks expected,
confidentiality, etc.), and then they gave their consent. Second, they were asked to answer the
initial scale items of pseudo-rationalism and then complete the DOG, PT, and IH. There were
two attention check questions in the middle of the questions, and those who did not make
appropriate answers to these questions were excluded from the analyses. After the survey was
done, they were redirected to Prolific.co again to get compensated.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
Item Finalization
Before conducting the main factor analysis, 12 out of 27 initial items were excluded and
15 were finally selected through the preliminary analysis. This analysis included a few more
strategies in addition to the initial factor analysis for the screening of inappropriate items. First, I
excluded some items based on the item-total correlations of each item. Gerbing and Anderson
(1988) described that the item-total correlations have been widely used for initial scale
development because it can be one of the best ways to see the constructs for unidimensional
assessment. Although there are no consented cutoff scores for item-total correlations, Nunnally
and Bernstein (1994) said that the corrected item-total correlations should be at least .3. Second,
I will verify whether the pairs of conflicting items (i.e., sets of one straight-coded item and one
reverse-coded item indicating the diametrically opposite statements) are reporting consistent
correlations with each other. According to Weijters and Baumgartner (2012), reverse-coded
items describing the opposite of the original items can be categorized as the ‘polar opposite’
items, and although adopting such items can have some merits, these items can also increase the
item inconsistency. If the pairs of items reported low correlations and there were no suitable
alternative explanations for them, such item pairs were regarded to be derived from the
misresponse and excluded. Finally, a preliminary exploratory factor analysis was conducted to
figure out the items with low communalities. See Appendix for more details regarding the
justification, criteria, and process of the preliminary analysis.
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Exploratory Factor Analysis
The exploratory factor analysis using a maximum likelihood method was conducted to
determine the structure of this measure. Although three initial eigenvalues greater than 1 were
extracted, both Velicer’s MAP test and the Parallel Analysis for the principal components
analysis recommended a two-factor solution. As I assume the correlation between factors, I used
the Promax oblique rotation to interpret the factor structure. The extracted two factors with this
rotation created the sums of squared loadings from 3.57 to 4.41. See Table 1 for the factor
loadings of each item. This exploratory analysis seems to be well-supporting the two-factor
structure, suggesting the first factor of α = .85 and the second factor of α = .80, which are
correlated with each other at r = .51. I interpreted that the second factor refers to the individualor intrapersonal-level pseudo-rationalism (i.e., endorsement of the personal belief regarding
rational judgments) and the first factor refers to the social- or interpersonal-level pseudorationalism (i.e., blaming other people’s judgments or aggressiveness).
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Factor
1

2

(social)

(individual)

People make stupid decisions when they get too emotional.

.80

To make the best decisions, you should be purely logical.

.26

My decisions are rarely influenced by my emotions.

.47
.44

Too many people are easily influenced by their feelings.

.84

Most people don’t consider the facts when making up their mind.

.60

More people should try to keep their emotions out of their decisions.

.72

People get foolish when they are driven by their emotions.

.74

People make bad decisions when they get emotional.

.70

-.23

Society would be better off if people weren’t so emotional.

.74

Society should make dispassionate decisions.

.50

People who value emotion above all else are ruining society today.

.52

People call you “offensive” when you’re just trying to say the facts.

.42

You can have emotions and be rational at the same time. (R)

-.33

.71

Our emotions make us wise. (R)

.54

Wisdom does not necessarily come from logic. (R)

.46

Note: (R) indicates reverse-coded items. Loadings with absolute values less than .2 were omitted.
Table 1. Factor Loadings of the Finalized Items

Correlations with Other Variables
See Table 2 for the correlation matrix for the variables measured in this study, including
descriptive statistics. It seems that discriminant validity of the new pseudo-rationalism scale was
confirmed because it has relatively lower correlations with PT, IH, and DOG compared to the
correlations between PT, IH, and DOG themselves. However, the correlations with intellectual
humility and dogmatism were measured lower than expected: Pseudo-rationalism was only
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marginally correlated with intellectual humility and not correlated with dogmatism. Looking at
the subscales (Factors 1 and 2), whereas Factor 2 (individual) was significantly correlated with
all the three scales (PT: r = -.25, IH: r = -.24, DOG: r = .23, all ps < .05), Factor 1 (social) was
only marginally correlated with the perspective taking (r = -.15, p = .066) but not with others
(IH: r = -.03, p > .10; DOG: r = -.08, p > .10). This indicates that unlike the individual subscale,
social subscale may have extremely low (or even lack) convergent validity.

PR
Pseudo-rationalism

PT

IH

DOG

.86

(PR)
Perspective taking

-.23*

.82

-.14†

.26*

.76

.10

-.20*

-.44**

.88

M

4.09

3.46

3.84

3.75

SD

0.79

0.74

0.58

1.00

(PT)
Intellectual Humility
(IH)
Dogmatism
(DOG)

Note: Italicized are Cronbach’s α.
†

p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .001.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of the Measures
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
This study has been a novel challenge to develop a new psychological concept that may
broaden our understanding of the fundamentals of people’s social behavior. Overall, I believe
this scale could reveal enough potentials to be a stable psychometric construct. This study, as I
first aimed to, could show some evidence for the validity of this new scale: To be specific, this
study demonstrated that 1) the psychological concept of pseudo-rationalism exists as a
measurable form, 2) such a measure can be established in a reliable and well-constructed state,
and 3) such a construct relates, at least slightly, to other conceptually similar measures. Such
validity evidence can enhance the feasibility of my theoretical assumption that this concept can
be considered as a sort of ‘meta-bias’ that stems from the more fundamental bias such as naïve
realism. Also, it shows the potential for this scale to be used to predict the primordial dark-side
traits of human beings, often expressed as ‘ignorance of ignorance,’ and further, the process that
such fundamentals develop into the rigid ideology or social extremity.
However, with this one study alone, which is by default preliminary, clear limitations
exist to confirm the validity or argue that this scale was developed perfectly. The biggest issue is
how to interpret the low (or perhaps, lack of) correlations of this new construct with the existing
measures. The most optimistic would be that this scale can be an original construct, which can
cover the areas that the current measures have not covered. Although this scale has a form of
self-report, it seems relatively free from social desirability, considering that it reported higher
mean score compared to dogmatism (pseudo-rationalism: 4.09 in 1~7 scale, dogmatism: 3.75 in
1~9 scale). Therefore, it may show some predictive ability that the existing measures could not
have. However, the diametrically opposite explanation is also possible: Unlike my hypothesis
that this measure can be a basis of various forms of rigidity or social extremism, this scale might

20

rather be closer to an individual property because only the individual subscale of pseudorationalism reported stable correlations with other similar scales (i.e., PT, IH, DOG) whereas the
social subscale did not. At least, I’m not sure if this scale can explain social extremism more than
the existing measures like social dominance orientation (SDO) or right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA).
Currently, it is hard to know which of these extremely contrasting expectations are
correct. Further studies will be needed to verify the predictive ability of this scale. There are
generally three major questions to test in future studies. First, to confirm the relationship with
naïve realism that I presented as a theoretical background, we can see whether the measured
pseudo-rationalism can predict the descendants of naïve realism, e.g., false consensus effect or
bias blind spot. Second, we can figure out the relationships of pseudo-rationalism with the
constructs germane to social extremism, e.g., SDO or RWA mentioned above. Finally, we may
see how much pseudo-rationalism can explain the actual extreme ideologies (e.g., supporting farright politicians, believing anti-intellectual conspiracy theories), and further, how well it can
explain compared to other potential predictors such as SDO, RWA, perspective taking,
intellectual humility, dogmatism, openness, agreeableness, etc.
Also, we need to discuss whether this scale is well-structured. Proposing a two-factor
model, I named one of them as individual pseudo-rationalism and the other as social pseudorationalism, but this classification may not have a sound basis. When looking into the items, we
can see that some items are (statistically) being classified into the individual factor even though
they explicitly seem to be in the social factor. Because this study was conducted just as an
exploratory analysis, some additional structural investigations such as the confirmatory factor
analysis (ideally, with slight revisions of the items) may be needed. The validity of the subscale
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is also a concern: We may have to consider removing all the items in the social dimension if it
turns out to be telling nothing.
Furthermore, even if this new measure passes all the analyses above, a question mark still
remains on whether this scale can be recognized as a lay cognitive trait that applies to everyone.
This study is just data-driven research without sufficient theoretical backgrounds, which can be
the biggest limitation, and my theory regarding the conceptual basis of pseudo-rationalism seems
somewhat unsystematic. It will take quite a long time for the conceptual significance of this scale
to be recognized, and even more so for me, a novice researcher who still has lots of room for
progress.
The last thing to consider is the difference in cultural backgrounds. Although the research
questions in this study mostly have derived from Korean cases, the collected data consists mostly
of American participants (see Prolific, 2021); therefore, investigating Koreans will also be
needed to verify whether this concept is also applicable to the group that I first aimed to.
Whether it is revealed to be a common trait that generally applies to all people, or whether it
reveals distinct cultural differences, I expect that they would both be interesting.

22

REFERENCES
Altemeyer, B. (2002). Dogmatic behavior among students: Testing a new measure of dogmatism.
The Journal of Social Psychology, 142(6), 713-721.
Ciarrochi, J. V., Chan, A. Y., & Caputi, P. (2000). A critical evaluation of the emotional
intelligence construct. Personality and Individual differences, 28(3), 539-561.
Côté, S., & Miners, C. T. (2006). Emotional intelligence, cognitive intelligence, and job
performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51(1), 1-28.
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS
Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a
multidimensional approach. Journal of personality and social psychology, 44(1), 113126.
Dobelli, R. (2013). The art of thinking clearly: better thinking, better decisions. Hachette UK.
Donohue, C. R. (2017). Joseph Agassi from Metaphysics to Politics. In Encouraging Openness
(pp. 19-26). Springer, Cham.
Dunning, D. (2011). The Dunning–Kruger effect: On being ignorant of one's own ignorance. In
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 44, pp. 247-296). Academic Press.
Essig, T. (2014, September 29). The Mysterious Popularity Of The Meaningless Myers-Briggs
(MBTI). Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/toddessig/2014/09/29/the-mysteriouspopularity-of-the-meaningless-myers-briggs-mbti/?sh=75e4a95f1c79
Flake, J. K., Pek, J., & Hehman, E. (2017). Construct validation in social and personality
research: Current practice and recommendations. Social Psychological and Personality
Science, 8(4), 370-378.

23

Gerbing, D. W., & Anderson, J. C. (1988). An updated paradigm for scale development
incorporating unidimensionality and its assessment. Journal of marketing
research, 25(2), 186-192.
Grant, A. (2013, September 18). Goodbye to MBTI, the Fad That Won’t Die. Psychology Today,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/give-and-take/201309/goodbye-mbti-the-fadwon-t-die
Haltiwanger, J. (2019, May 10). Ben Shapiro, a conservative famous for asking people to debate
him, stormed out of an interview he didn't like. Business Insider,
https://www.businessinsider.com/ben-shapiro-storms-out-of-bbc-interview-2019-5
Kim, J. H. (2019, September 23). Hate speech? Science is the realm of reason, not emotion.
Kyunghyang,
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201909231147001
Leary, M. R., Diebels, K. J., Davisson, E. K., Jongman-Sereno, K. P., Isherwood, J. C., Raimi,
K. T., Deffler, S. A., & Hoyle, R. H. (2017). Cognitive and interpersonal features of
intellectual humility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(6), 793-813.
Myers, I. B. (1998). MBTI manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator. Consulting Psychologists Press.
Nemeth, E. (1991). Otto Neurath’s utopias—the will to hope. In Rediscovering the Forgotten
Vienna Circle (pp. 285-292). Springer, Dordrecht.
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3rd ed.). New York, NY:
McGraw Hill.

24

Park, N. (2020, June). MBTI Fad in Korea & Celebrity MBTI Types. Retrieved November 14,
2020, from https://www.creatrip.com/en/blog/7496/MBTI-Fad-in-Korea-CelebrityMBTI-Types
Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies. Routledge.
Prolific. (2021). Explore our participant pool demographics. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from
https://www.prolific.co/demographics/
Pronin, E., & Kugler, M. B. (2007). Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection
illusion as a source of the bias blind spot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
43(4), 565-578.
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus
others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(3), 369-381.
Rabinowitz, M., Latella, L., Stern, C., & Jost, J. T. (2016). Beliefs about childhood vaccination
in the United States: Political ideology, false consensus, and the illusion of
uniqueness. PloS one, 11(7), e0158382.
Rokeach, M. (1954). The nature and meaning of dogmatism. Psychological Review, 61(3), 194–
204.
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in
social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
13(3), 279-301.
Shapiro, B. (2016, February 5). Facts don't care about your feelings. Retrieved November 14,
2020, from https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/695638866993115136
Thyer, B. A., & Pignotti, M. G. (2015). Science and Pseudoscience in Social Work Practice.
Springer, pp. 49-51.

25

Ward, A., Ross, L., Reed, E., Turiel, E., & Brown, T. (1997). Naive realism in everyday life:
Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. Values and Knowledge, 103-135.
Weijters, B., & Baumgartner, H. (2012). Misresponse to reversed and negated items in surveys:
A review. Journal of Marketing Research, 49(5), 737-747.
West, K., & Eaton, A. A. (2019). Prejudiced and unaware of it: Evidence for the DunningKruger model in the domains of racism and sexism. Personality and Individual
Differences, 146, 111-119.
Wojcieszak, M. (2008). False consensus goes online: Impact of ideologically homogeneous
groups on false consensus. Public Opinion Quarterly, 72(4), 781-791.

26

APPENDIX: INITIAL ITEMS AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
The items below are initial items, not the final items. Only the bold items were selected
as the final items. See the results section for the properties of the selected items. (R) refers to the
reverse-coded items. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
•
•

PR1: People make stupid decisions when they get too emotional.
PR2: To make the best decisions, you should be purely logical.

•

PR3: To make a good decision, you need to listen to your heart. (R)

•

PR4: My decisions are rarely influenced by my emotions.

•
•

PR5: Too many people are easily influenced by their feelings.
PR6: I’m able to keep my personal feelings out of my decisions.

•
•
•

PR7: Most people don’t consider the facts when making up their mind.
PR8: More people should try to keep their emotions out of their decisions.
PR9: I make my judgments based on reason. 1

•
•

PR10: I make my judgments based on emotions. (R)
PR11: I behave according to what my brain knows. 12

•

PR12: I behave according to what my heart wants. (R) 2

•

PR13: People get foolish when they are driven by their emotions.

•
•

PR14: People make bad decisions when they get emotional.
PR15: Society would be better off if people weren’t so emotional.

•
•
•

PR16: Society should make dispassionate decisions.
PR17: People who value emotion above all else are ruining society today.
PR18: Every judgment should be based only on the facts. 2

•
•

PR19: Every judgment should consider people’s feelings. (R) 2
PR20: We could make more progress on important social issues if people weren’t
so emotional.

•

PR21: People call you “offensive” when you’re just trying to say the facts.

•

PR22: You can have emotions and be rational at the same time. (R)

•
•
•

PR23: To be logical is to be heartless. 1
PR24: Our emotions make us wise. (R)
PR25: Wisdom does not necessarily come from logic. (R)

•
•

PR26: I have to understand others’ positions, even if they criticize me. (R) 1
PR27: Good decisions require considering others’ point of view. (R) 1

1

: eliminated in the item-total analysis, 2: eliminated in the conflicting item analysis.
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To select the items for the final analysis, a series of preliminary analyses was performed.
The factor analysis directly conducted without preliminary screening did not generate interesting
results: In the initial factor analysis (with maximum likelihood and Promax rotation), among the
finally extracted three factors, the first factor consisted of non-reversed items but the second and
third factors generally consisted of reversed items. In particular, Factor 1 consisted of PR1, PR5,
PR7, PR8, PR11, PR13, PR14, PR18, PR20, and PR21, which were all straight (non-reverse)
coded, but Factor 2 consisted of PR3 (R), PR10 (R), and PR12 (R) and Factor 3 consisted of
PR22 (R), PR23a, PR26 (R), and PR27 (R). I interpreted that these results should not only be
against the initial hypotheses but be the artifact of response bias such as acquiescence and
therefore, decided to screen out the inappropriate items prior to the factor analysis to identify the
true factor structure, leading to the final results deduced in the main text.
Roughly two screening analyses were performed here. The first one is the analysis of
item-total correlations: Although Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) recommended the cutoff of .3
for the corrected item-total correlations, I adopted more relaxed criteria (.25) for reverse-coded
items because this study is just exploratory and reverse-coded items tend to have less consistency
than non-reversed ones. Based on these twofold criteria (non-reversed items > .3, reversed items
> .25), several items were eliminated: PR9 (.27), PR11 (.18), PR23 (.15), PR26 (.23), and PR27
(.13). The removed items in this stage were marked as 1.
Second, if the conflicting items (i.e., pairs of one straight and non-reversed item and one
reverse-coded item describing the diametrically opposing statements) are not showing the non-

a

This item was originally designed for reverse coding but actually analyzed with straight coding

because the straight coding rather generated comparatively relevant results.
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trivial and stable correlations (i.e., r < .2), they were also eliminated. The pairs of PR11 and
PR12 (r = .00) and PR18 and PR19 (r = .11) belonged to it. Although Weijters and Baumgartner
(2012) suggested being careful about interpreting inconsistent polar opposite items especially
when people are answering negatively on both the non-reversed and reversed items, such
tendencies were not observed in this study: Most people tended to be agreeing with both of the
opposite items (MPR11 = 5.36, MPR12 = 4.43; MPR18 = 3.99, MPR19 = 4.64). Therefore, these items
were regarded as the results of misresponse and eliminated. The items marked as 2 refer to it.
Finally, a preliminary exploratory factor analysis was conducted with the remaining 19
items. Five initial eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted in this analysis, but both the scree
plot and Parallel Analysis recommended a two-factor solution. The table below represents the
pattern matrices with two different extraction methods and Promax rotation. The items were
eliminated based on the two criteria:
1. Items without reaching the loadings of .3 in at least one factor were eliminated.
2. Items with .3 or more in both factors were eliminated.
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Maximum Likelihood (ML)

Principal Axis (PA)

Factor

1 (social)

2 (individual)

1 (social)

2 (individual)

PR1

.83

-.10

.81

-.08

PR2

.24

.46

.22

.48

PR3 (R)

.19

.28

.15

.34

PR4

.13

.48

.12

.52

PR5

.87

-.25

.91

-.29

PR6

.28

.29

.30

.28

PR7

.62

-.11

.62

-.10

PR8

.74

.00

.74

.01

PR10 (R)

.21

.32

.17

.39

PR13

.74

.06

.73

.05

PR14

.70

.10

.66

.12

PR15

.09

.75

.11

.72

PR16

.18

.48

.18

.46

PR17

.15

.57

.21

.50

PR20

.47

.29

.51

.25

PR21

.45

.06

.47

.03

PR22 (R)

-.36

.70

-.33

.66

PR24 (R)

-.06

.58

-.10

.64

PR25 (R)

-.16

.46

-.18

.49

PR3 and PR6 belonged to the first criterion in ML and therefore eliminated. PR10 barely
passed the criterion 1 in ML but was also eliminated for more rigorous item selection. Although
below the criteria, PR20 also created too high factor loadings in both factors and therefore
eliminated, completing the final 15 items.
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